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ABSTRACT: 
The purpose of this paper is to generalize the use of money i f 
t 
measures of welfare change to si tuations in wh-ich the consum.~r i 
faces quantity constraints. The usefulness of this approach lies , 
in its wide scope of application, including situations i
rationing. (in the strictest sense, suc"h a.5"/ those imposed during 
.\ I 
times of war),situations of markert disequilibrium and those in I i 
.which there are externalities .(public goods, 
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I0. Introduction I
,
rhe purpose- .of this paper. is to gener~lize the use of money 
measures of welfare change to sit.uat.ions in t,Jhich the consumer 
faces quanti t.y constraint.s. The .usefulnes.s of t.his approach lies 
in its wide scope of ap~lication~ including situati.ons of 
rationing (in the strictest sense, such as those imposed during 
times of war), situations of markert disequilibrium and t.hose in 
which there are externalities (public goods, for example). 
The evaluation of the efficiency of any kind of any resource 
allocation mechanism requires, as a necessary condit.ion, 
id~ntif ic~tion .of individual welfare measl..;lfes. From an abstract. 
/ 
viewpoint, an individual welfare measuie, corresponds to the 
~oncept of utility function. 
For Applied· r'lelf are Economics it is desirable to obtain a 
function whose values have an intuitive counterpart. One way t.o 
I 
1provide fer intuition would be to consider the ,possibili ty c·f \ 
-! 
expressing such a measure in monetary units. This is because such I 
! 
an expresiion allows the comparison between costs and benefits and 
between gains and losses (see, for example, Blinder (1982), 
Earberger (1971) and t1cKenz ie (1983»). It is cus t(.im~ry to i..~·rj t..:i fy 
measures of this class as money metrics (a concept introduced by 
Samuelson (1974». 
theory of consumer behavior under quantity constraints as 
presented by Rothbarth (1940), Samuelson (1947)~ Tobin and 
Houthakker (1951, 1952), Tobin (1952), Pollack (1969, 1971), 
Diewert (1978), Latham (1980), Neary and Robert.s (1980), Deaton 
3 
and Muellbal1er (1980), Deaton (1981) and Diewert (1986). 
A measu~e of wel~are change is no more th~n a measure of the 
distance between two indifference surfaces. An interesting. , 
prope~ty of the 
welfar.e change, 
with variations 
first difference in money' metrics, as measures of 
is its commensurability, for a given price vector, 
.. 
in income. The possibility of construct.ing t.his 
. t 
t 
type of measure given the pre-ordering relation defined by 
consumer preferences was adressed i~ the work of Weymark
. " 
(1985). 
When there are quantity 90nstr.aints, however, the first 
difference of money metries ( .. a la Samuelson-Weymark") ceases to. 
be equivalent to variations in income, thereby loosing some of its 
intuitive appeal. 
The first section of this paper will ~neralize the Horl: of 
.I 
Weymark (1985) by allowing quantity constraints. The ffiain result 
~f this section will establish the possibility of representing the 
consumer's preference preorderig using the .concept of money 
metrics (i.e. it will be proven that" the money metric is a.utility 
function). As one would suspect this result is proven under 
"' 
stronger conditions on tHe preference pre-ordering than those 
needed j.n- Weymarl{ (1985). These aditional rest.rietions shoqJ d be I 
recognized and interpreted, especially in applications. f 
f 
expend:i:ture function, j.-ts generalization by allowil:1g q ..l;:irlti t I 
constraints relates to the restricted expendi ture funct.ion (as i 
in0d by N3ary ~nd Roberts (1980)). 
The use of the first difference of the restricted expenditure 
fu!!ction as a measure of welfare c:hange was proposed by KirLg 
(1983, 1986), Cornwall (1984) and Maler (1985). The second section 
of this paper examines the foundations of this proposal according 
I 
• 	 I 
I 
4 
I 
f; 
to the contribution of Weymark (198;;). 
-
I 
In the third section the problem of computing the money 
- . . 
measures of welfare change will be considered~ The emphasls -will * 
be on'the information requirements' of such a computation. 'J 
The discussion ,of this' problem, in the frame~.;orl~ of the 
. 
traditional ,model of consumer behavior," follows two paths: the 
ca.lculation of approximate measures -and approximation properties 
(McKenzie and Pearce (1976), WilliK (1976 a, b), Seade (1978) and i 
. ' I 
Mckenzie (1983); the calculation' of exact measures (Zajac (1979),
. . . 
Haussman (1981), Vartia (1983) and McKenzie and Ulph (1986)l.The 
second section of this paper will consider the problem of I 
calculating exac,t measures of welfare change t.o a consumer 
faqes qua~tity constraints., 
/ 
The fourth. section will deal wi th application,s of the I
1presented methodology. 
The first application will illustrate the use of t.he sum of 1 
equivalent variations (E EV) 'as an· aggregate meaS\,lre of, welfare i l 
t. 
(and waste) in an economy with public goods. The relation between ,~ i 
E EV and Pareto optimality'will be studied. It will be shown that 1 
1 
E EV is' an appropriate measure of aggregate welfare losses i t 
associated with sub-optimal resource allocation. The importance of 
1an effici(:;ncy in t,hi.s 1:::)l _1c:o:ntext was 
. _, '." ,_l. j 
Sandler (1936). 
The second application concerns the extension of the economic 1 
r Y l' !3 bye() n .$ i d;;::: r p:: xis ten (:': e 0 f ;:":; 1. ~ :-:- 1 .;"-:: 1 
goods. This extension was suggested by Baye and Black (1~86). _._. j 
the i:::d:::_rcdos::P~~C:::::~n:~:;l~:~mp::::::r:~ the evaluation ;1UL 
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1.Monsv Metric Utility Functions 
4et us begin by defin~ni the consumption set as the subset of 
the n-dimen$ional Euclidean space, [Rrt, whi~h corresponds to t.he 
set of the phisically possible consumption bundles (see Debreu 
(1959)). This set will be identified.with the non-negative orthant 
. n 
of the n-dimensional euclidean space, 
-+ 
This is made 
. " 
IR,. assumption 
only for the sake of simplicity and could, for example, b~ 
generalized by considering the possibility of upper bounds on the 
consumption of some goods. Such generalization would allo~.; 
consideration of leisure, the consumption pfL which is limited by 
the availability ~f time. 
It is also assumed that the consumer has preferences that 
define a complete pre-ordering ("Rto). A complete pre-ordering i3 a 
relation which is complete, transitive and reflexive. 
For two consumption bundles x and y belonging to the 
consumption set. (x, Y E (Rn-), "xRy" means that "x is preferred or 
-to 
indifferent to y". The preference pre-ordering gives rise to t.wo 
more relations: the' strict preference relation J "P" , .~nd the 
indifferenCe rel ion, "I". 
Thus, "xPy", "x is strictly -preferl"ed to y" if "xEy" btit nO-l. 
the reciprocal. On the other hand "xly", "x is indifferent to y" 
We can now define util~ty function: 
DEFINITION: The function: 
6 
, 

t 
" 
& 
j 
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I 

u: 	 [Rn -+ IR 

+ 

is a utility function. for a consumer whose preferences are 
described by the preferenc'e pre-or9.ering, "R" if: 
u ( x) ~ u ( y) .... "xRy " ( 1 ) t 
J 
The above definition is equiv~lent to: 
u ( x ) > u( y) .. "xPy II 	 (2a) 
and 

u(x) = u(y) .. "xly" (2b) 

This equivalence can be established poting that it is 
immediate that (2) => (1,) and verifying on the other hand t.l'l':1t: 
"xPy" # "xRy'" and not "yRx" C> 
/ 
.\ 
which by (1) is e~uivalent to: 
u(x) ~ u(y) and not u(y) ~ u(x) . 
i.e. (2a), (2b) could be establis~ed in an entirely analogous way. t 
t 
We 6an now define the set of consumption bundles preferred or 
indifferent to x as: i 
nu (x) = {z E lR : " zRx " } 
+ + 	 1 
and the set, of consumption bundles t.o which x is prefered or 
t 
indiffernt to as: t 
t 
~ ~'l,:;; can also define the i 
of the consumption bundle: 
x -	 [x , x 1 p (~., 
where xp is a vector of dimension n~ and xQ a vector of dimension 
Finally we may introduce the following function: 
7 
* * M(p n ; X)1 u (X); z= 01- ( :3 )
+ Q. ­
'. 
.n 
Pp E [R 
++ 
1 and 0* is a non-neg~tive-.in which p = [p , p 
vector of diemnsion n ,
2 
. The interpretation of (3) will be dealt with subsequently, It 
'III' * 
should be noted, however, that p. and 0" are parameters ~hile x is 
th~ argument of the function:. 
The main resul t. of' this sect.ion is that, under coneli tions 
which will be rigorously specified below, M(p* n• x) is a 
* .•
utility function. Conditions under which M(p J 0 x) can be 
interpreted as a money metric will also be presented below. 
We will also assume that the preference pre-ordering is 
"" 
continuous i.e. that: 
./ 
./ 
U ex) = {z. E, (Rn: IzRx"} 
+ +,\ 
and 
[Rn:U
-
(x) = {z e 
+ 
"xRz"} 
are closed sets. Then if: 
"xR [O, 0*] " and "yR [0, n* ]" (43) 
n 
:1 ( ('\ -s'r:R X 1. _.l. * } n U (x) ;::;. 0 (40)
+ + 
n 
i.[R X {rl• } ('") U (y) ~ 0 (4c)
+ + 
we have: 
II xRy II .. *., ; ~ * , ;M ( p n x ) M(p n * y) 
-t,
that. is in the domaln def ined by (4) lvl( P* ., 0; x) 1 S aut. j .1 i t.Y 
funct.ion. 
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I 
Proof: 
The proof will take pIace in two $teps: in the first it will 
be demonstrated that problem (3) has a solution. In the second, 
* * 	 ..that 	~(p In; x) verifies the definition of a utility function. 
(i) 	 We need to prove that under the above mentioned 
assumptions 	there exists a solution to pro~lem (3). 
From (4b): 
1'"'1 
1 	 * lR X {n } n U (x) j!' 0 
+ 	 + 
so it contains at least one element, say w. We may consider a 
consumption bundle z, wi th z. = w. + 6 J i = 1 J ••• ,11... Z. = w.,
. 1. 1. 	 ;a. 
J 
\. \. 
'\ 	 * * .. .i=n +1, ... ,n. We can now define the set H- = {le[R. X{O }: p w~p w}.
1 
~ , -.... ~~ .:-:­Consider, then, the set H-I"l U (x) which a non-empty SE:t ..J ..... ~J.L"_' .... ' 
• 
it contains w. But H-(, U (x) is a closed se.l{ (intersection of t~;o
'. 	 /. 
closed sets) and :bounded (H- is a bounded 'set). Since H-() U+(x) is 
\ 
a closed and bou~ded subset of ~,n it is a compact set. 
Furthermore,. it is clear that the solution to the problem 
over H-n U 
+ 
(x) is identical to t.he solution over the who.le dorna.in. 
Onder these conditions, the existence of a solution to (3) is 
assured by Weierstrass Theorem (Fleming ( 1977), Theorem 2. 10. , 
pp.61-62 6r Syd5~ter (1981), Theorem 5.1., p.219). 
.. (i1) We now need t,o prove that M(p* , o·, x) is a utility 
function. 
~i.. If "xRy" tlien G+(x) c U+(y) by transitivity. Thea: 
n n . 

[R 1 X {n*} n U (x) c IR :1 X {O*} (J U (.v) 

+ 	 + + + 
thu:-:;,: 
*.* 	 *.M(p 0 ; x) ~ M(p , n ; y)J 
which shows that: 
* * * *
"xRy" 	 .... M(p , n ; x) ~ M(p , n ; y) 
9 
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b. Let us define U 
++ 
(x) as: 
u (x) = {z E [Rn: "zPx")
++ 	 + l 
If "yPx" then U+ (y) . ~5 stri9tly contained in U++ (x) which, I 
itself, is strictly contained in U 
+ 
(x). f 
Bui then for any consumption bundle 3 E U (y) we can define a
+ .' 
• 	 n 
6 neighborhood:r No (z) (relat!ve to .rR:) such that. No (z)riR+ 1. X .{n·} 
.. 
would be contained in U (x).
++ 
Therefore: 
M(p* I n*·, y) > inf {p*z: Z E U++ (x) ; zQ =O} ~ z 

2:: M(p* I n .. ;, x) 

.. 	 .. 
which shows that "yPx" .. M(p• , n . , y) > M(p* , o·. ,. x) • 
c. We will now use b. to pro~,,"'e the l"eciprocal of fl.. 
contradiction. 	We will establish ~hat: ,/ 
* *,. * * M ( P n ; x ). ~ t1 ( p , n ; y ) ~ "xRy "J 
Let us suppose that: 
*.. * 0.*. .M(p In; x) ~ M(p, ,y) and "yPx" 
That proposition would contradict b. establishing the result.c 
i 
It is important to discuss the importance of the assumptions I 
1 
(4) 	 for Theorem 1. Thus (4b) and (4c) ~ssure the existence to the 
t 
'1/<. .:# 
problem that defines M(p , n ; x). f 
.{The necessity of (4a) can be €:st.abl.i by noting t1' t.. 
Iof TheoJ:Glll 1. ;::(.aSUnl1-"tion non-satiatioh was made in the 
in the absence of any regularity hypothesis of the type of (4a), 
t,:he preferences may assume a conftgurati.on as in Fi~1".1. Tn 
such a case the result would not be valid. 
It should be not,ed t,hat the assumptions needed to E:: .ish 
•Theorem 1 are insufficient to assure the continuity of M(p, 
o'* ; x). They are, sufficient, however, to assure the existence of 
10 
I 
a continuous utility functipn (see Debreu (1954)). 
It is convenient to iritroduee a local anel global notion of 
non-satiation (relative to Q): 
. DEFINITION: 
(i) A consumption bundle·x e"~n is a point of local. satiation 
-I­
relative to n if there exists a neighbbrhood 6 of ~ such that: 
.. {ri }} n u (x) =0 
++ 
(ii)A consumption bundle X e {Rn 
+ 
is a point of global 
satiation relative to n if: 
n 
tR :1 X {O* } (j U (x) = 0 
-t, ++, 
We may now enunciate the following resl,}It: 
;' 
THEOREM 2: 
I f any poin"t of local satiation l"'elativa to 0 * i3 a1:30 ·9. 
point of satiation then M(p*" 0-, x) a contin.u.ou;3global '* 
function. 
J 
Proof: 
t).. functi011 ci)nt.inuou;:.~ if 
semicontinuQus. That is, if the sets: 
n .* 
.'* {xelR : M(p ('J , x) ~ rr}J
+ 
L 
r t1 ( i~* , (2* :;; n)
+ 
were closed sets for any n e ~. 
'-Gi. ven t.hat, U ( .) and U (.) are closed set.s it is :::ut £1 l_:i.t~;;l (,+. . 
... *.
t.!) gU;:~,1:'Flntee t,hat. t.he range of t.he function M(p J 0 ; x) is a 
convex set.. 
11 

Consider then IT and rr! belonging to t~e range of 
with IT < IT'. Considerrr• as a convex c9mbination of IT and IT' • 
•have, by construction, that n < n . < Tl". 
•The idea is to prove the existence of x such that: 
M(p* ,0* ; x * ) = IT * (* ) 
It is enough to consider the problem: 
I 
1 
max u(x)
x 
( 
s.t. t 
• * f p x :$ IT 
f 
xQ = n / t 
x e [Rn J 
+ 
I 
itand to verify that its solution x * satisfles (*) which Gould t 
made by contradiction. o 
, 
Fo~ the interpretation of the results obtaine4, it is useful 
" 
to introduce the following identity: 
M(p* n* ; x) ; e(p* , n* ; u(x»· =J 
.)j.< 
,. :":" " {p z: U(2) u (x) , Z :: G} \. ~-' lQ 
in which e(p'" ,0 *' u(x) is the restricted expenditure function as 
.defi N;·:::ary ann rts (1980). 
It is important to stress that the functions M(p, 0; x) ~nd 
e(p, n; u) are not identical. 'In fact the argument of the iirsL is 
x while the arguments of the second are p, nand u. 
Nevertheless, given the identity (5), the results above are 
12 
relevant to the restricted expenditure function. In fact, in the , 
~ eonditions of Theorem 1, which are usually assumed in tex.t.books I 
and also in aplications, the restricted expenditure functic:m is· , 
~ stric~ly increasing in its utility argument. This result is t, 
I 
stronger than the commonly proven proposition that the restricted 
expenditure function is not decr~asing in .utility. t 
I 
I, 
I 
t 
1 
/ j 
t 
,I 
i 
J 
, 
t 
I 
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2. Eauivalent Variation and Compensating Variation , 
I 
! 
To int.roduce 	 t.he welfare change measures that may be ; 
'* *' . 
I 
construcited from M(p , 0 ; ~) and to motivat.e it~ .designation as 
a money metric it is useful to consider a simple example 
.. 
characterized by: 
BASE SITUATION CURRENT SITUATION 

p p 

in which p represents the price vector, n the rat.ioning 1 ~:::"':f~d. 
wh~ch the.consumer confronts and I represen~~ income. 
/ 
The superscript "0" identifies the' base situation and t.he 
.superscript "1" the current situation. So the only changes 
considered in this example are in the rationing levels and income. 
If non-satiation is verifi~d (for non rationed goods) we 
have: 
t 
f 
t
-0 0
e(p, -0 ; u(x » 
iin Hhich X rept'(::Z6nts t.he conSlU~lption bundle tha.t mi. ~~3 I 
consumer's utility in. the'i-th situation, i=0,1. 1 
Notice that 	 the validity of M(p, (l', x) above as I I 
i 
representative 	of the consumer' preference prf~-o:e(lerlng I 
require the verification of non-satiation. But non-satiation is. I 
fundamental to allow the interpretation of M(p, n ;.' x) as a rnoney I I 
metric. Non-satiation will be assumed throyghout the remainder 'of I 
the paper. 
14 
We may now define an equivalent variation as: 
EV = 
- 0° . Xi) - 0'0 . XO ) 
-
.M(p, , M(p, 1 = 
0.0. 
! =
. - e(p, 0;° u( X :1 ) e(p, u(x0 » 
:1 :1
e(p, 0.0', u(x ») - e(p, . 0.1 .,• u(x )' T. ( Ii 1° ) ( 6)= 
This measure determines the income variation that would 
guarantee to the consumer the weifare change that would occur with 
the passage from the base to the current 8i tuation. Hence the 
designation of equivalent variation. This measure of welfare 
change can be interpreted (in an analogous way) as the expendl~~~~ 
. .'
va.riation. in non-rationed goods which permits, with gl 'len pr~CE::S 
and 1"ationing levels, t.he consumer to experience tne welfare 
.change which would occur' with the change from the base to the 
current situation. 
The equation (6) also shows that, talting base pricf.;.:s and 
rationing levels as given, variations in M(~, 0; x) are 
commensurate with income changes. 
JThe equivalent variation as defined above is a measure of 
welfare gain. The legitimacy of this interpretation is guaranteed 
" .. .. ,­by Tb.eorem 1; the' equi'l'",l'aJ.ent variation is posit.ive if a i1 (~ ,~~.. i. #. 1. :l""~ 1. I 
there is an increment in consumer's utility. That is= 
. i, 0 
.;. u(x .I >- u(x ) 
We can now deal with the general case. Allowing for the 
simultaneous change of prices, rationing levels and income. 
So, let us consider: 
15 
BASE SITUATION, CURRENX SITUATION 
o l' p P 
" 
. 
~s above we. may "define an.equivalent variation as: 
EV = 
M(po , nO; x ) - M(po , . nO., X ) -­= 1 O 
t 0 0nO, nO. 
.j= e(p° , , u{x » e(p , , u{x » = 
. 
0 1 1 1 100.0.= e(p , , u(x » - e(p , rl-, u(x » + ( I1 - ) (7) 
The equivalent variation in (7), like the previous one (6), 
determines the income variation that w~,U1d guarantee t.o the 
consumer the welf,are change that would occur with the passage from 
the base to the current situation. The interpretation of (7) is 
therefore analogous to that of (6). That is, for the general case, 
the equivalent variation" as defined in (7) J is a legitimate 
indicator of welfare gain. Formally: 
EV ):0 ... u(x:t ) ) u(x0 ) 
A compensating variation could be defined in a similar way 
as: 
cv = 
1 1 1 
= M(p J 0. ,• Xi) - M(p" cl·, x O ) = 
1 1 1 1 1 0
e(p , 0. ,• u(x » - e(p J 0. . u(x »J = = 
= e(p° 0.0-, u(x0 » - e{p·t , 0.1 ,. u(x° » + ( I1 - IO ) (8)J 
16 

I
, 
;The compensating vari1:ttion determines the amount of income 
that the consumer would be .willing to pay in order to obtain the­ 'Or: 
cu~re~t situation fro"m the base situation. .. 
The compensating variation, as defined above is a measure of 
welfare gain. The legitimacy.of ~his interp~etation is .. guaranteed 
i 
by. Theorem 1:' the .compensating varia'tion is positive if and only t 
if·there is an increment 'in consumer's utility. 
t 
That is: 1 
,t 
I 
\ 
These results establish that the compensating and equivalent 
va~iation!? are legitimate m'e'asures of welf/ai.'e change between' t.wo 
situations (i.e. ~o perform binary compar~sons). 
< • 
On the other hand there is an important difference betweeri 
f 
the equivalent .and the compensating variation. In fact the t 
J 
evaluation of the welfare change between a base and several 
alternative current situations, using the equivalent variation, is 
sufficient to the ranking of those situations. This ,result is a 
direct corisequence of Theorem 1 since the comparison between the 
base and each of the current situations is made using the same 
vector of Pl'ices· and rationing levels as PC'tl:'smet·ers in th i ::' ;~;('nE::Y 
metric, 
The same does not hold for the compensating variation, as·can 
easily be established usi.ng an example. Take three "Situations: 
BASE SITUATION CURRENT SITUATION 1 
o 1 p P 
17 

CURRENT SITUATION '2 
'2 
P 
The compensating variation associated wi th t.he passage from 
the base to i can be des:i.gnated as 
-'
situation situation r.Vl 
. 
(i=l,~). Assuming, then, that p~:;0, that. ol..=o (i =1 , 2) " and also 
'" 1 2 2that (l{, p , kp ) = . (p , 12: , k>0, we have;
" , 
cr = M(pi , Q., Xi) - M(p,j, n·)- XO ) 

CV2 2 2 
= M(p2 , x - o·, XO ), Q- ) M(p, . = 
= M( kp1 , n', x t ) - M(kp,1 o·, XO ) = 
It.. Cyt= 
" 
/
" 
.\ 
rlnotice, on the o,ther hand that situa,t.ion 1 an'd s1 t.uation .:.. are 
., 
".indifferent by construction. But cr < ·c~ if k 1 and CV1 ",. cvz.'" 
if k < 1. This proves that the comparison of compensating 
variations between a base and s~veral alternative sitUt~t.ion3 i;;,: 
insuffi~ient to get the welfare ranking of the alternatives. 
It is important to ponder the significance of the results 
obtained up to this point. 
It has been est.ablished ·that .knowing the consumer' 5 
preff;rB:nce pre--ordering it is possible to construct an l:t.:~l:!.y 
function whose first difference is commensurate with variatioI.i..:3 il,j. 
income, for given prices and rationing levels. Nevertheless the 
pr3ctic31 relevance of this res~lt is ~xtremelly limited. 
This point can be clarified through an argument of Balasko 
(1988): we may conceive ofexperiments through which sucessi~e 
comparison of consumption bundles would allow "the determination 'of 
consumer preferences to any degree of accu~acy desired (as5uming 
18 
. t 
, . } 
i 
t 
t 
t
i. 
i 
i 
:
i 
t 
~ 
,
that the an'~;wers are honest). Therefor~ there is no theore·tieal 
t. , 
diff iculty with the -implementation -of. the concept. Nevertheless t 
not. ithe practical realization of such a ·t~p~ of I'lxperiment does 
seem reasonable. 
This last observation serves to introduce the following 
of 
,
, 
section. 
, I/ / I 
! 
t 
4 
; 
t 
1 
1 
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3. Computing Variations in Money Metrics: the example of 
Equivalent Variation. 
The purpose. of this section is the identificatiofl of a 
suitabl~.process of computation fo~ the firsi difference in money 
~etrics.The idea is to present a process which uses information 
that one might get frofu the ob~ervaiion of ~onsumer behavior. 
We will show that for the computation of the first difference 
i·n money metrics it is sufficient to know the dt?mand syst.em (for 
nbn-rationed goods) and the system of marginal benefit functions 
(for rationed goods), t 
,,; tIn order to understand the ~omputation/process it is useful t 
I 
.1 I 
to digress a bit into the area of oOnsumer behavior under I 
I 
rationing. t 
I,
The indirect utility function may be defin~d (after Pollack i 
J 
a C'· y;J •(1969)) 
v(p, 0; I) =max {u(x): x e XJ px = I, x =O} (9)
x Q 
t 
in the formulation .of . (9) the l}¥Pothesis of non-satiation is , 
assumed. We can construct the lagrangean function that corr~s~onds I 
to problem (9): 1 
L = u(x) + A{I-px) + T(-Xp ) + ¢(n~xQ ) (10) 
Assuming differentiability of.v(p, 0; I) we have: 
- -A.X (11a) 
up 
iIv 
= ¢ ( 11b) ion 
-
iJv 
- =
A (lle) t 
aI 
~ 
Noti.ce that x = x(p, n; -I), ·A = )..(P, n;. I) and ¢ ='4>(p, 0; I). 
Th.at is, the demand functions x(p, 0; I) depend parametrically on 
. 
the price vector and on income 1 as well as on the rationing 
levels. 
¢i(P, 0; I) is the variation in utility that is made possible I 
by a unitary increase in the quantity constraint relative to the f 
"i-th" "good. The marginal value of the good, 
.; 
for the consumer; 
/'
evaluated. in monetary units is therefore, (p. +(¢, fA.) ) . This 
~ '\. 
, 
function is designated as marginal benefit function (or marginal 
.. .. \ 
..willingness to pay functlon) corre~ponding to commodity i. 
t4>. may be - posttive or negat!ve. 4>. will be posi tive t ~ ~ ~ 
(n~gatiye) if the marginal benefit corresponding to the good i is 
j 
more (less) than the respective price. 
Equations (7) and (11) provide the fundamental elements for 
., .~the compu-tation of t.he equivalent variation. The procedure .......-, 
analogous t·o that int.roduced for the case wi thout rationing by 
Zajac (1979), Haussman (1981), Stahl II (1983),Vartia 
McKenzie and Ulph (1986). 
It must be remembered that the possibility of obtairiing 
. . 
individual measures of Helfare change, from the Dupui t'-'~'~~~l'.:":-l'~t~_l 
consumer's surplus, is limited in general by its dependence on th~ 
21 
H 
The idea is t.o re2.t.rict the. path of int.egrat.ion, for the 
demand and marginal benefit functions, tn order to follow a given 
indifference curve. 
For example, to compute the equivalent variation it is 
. 
, 0 1 1
sufficient to determine e~p , e(p .n; sinceI. 
(lio-lO) is known. So its computation depends only on t.he variation 
of the expenditure function along the indifference curve. 
To proceed it is useful to differenti~te the indirect utility 
function (using (11»: 
dv = -Xxdp + ¢dn + XdI· 

or: 

dv * /
.\ =--Axdp + ¢dO + AdI . ( 12) 
as A. > 0 (assuming non-satiation), the sign of dv is determined by 
the sign of the right hand ~ide of (12). 
Making dv = 0 in (12), in order to dertermine the variation 
in expendi ture t.hat allows the consumer to keep the same nt.ility 
level, we get: 
t¢ ­
= xdp - - dO I 
A 
f 
or, considering an auxilliary variable, t, we have: 
= x ( p ( t ), 0 ( t), I ( t) ) dp ( t ) - - (p ( t), n ( t ), I ( t) ) dO ( t ) 
dt 
(13) 
equation (13) is an expression which, if integrated, allows us ~o 
obtain the expenditure variation. Since i~ is a first order 
differential equation (correponding to an ~xact differential) it 
22 
" 
admits a unique solution. 
• 
Therefore: t 
dp(t) ¢ dQ(t) .. 
~* ( 1) - 1* (en = :f [x ----- ]dt 
 It dt. A. dt0 
i . i° 0in which t E [0, 1], p(0) = 'p , . p ( 1) = p' l' n (0) = n ,. n ( 1) = n 
* iand I (0) = I . We can now present an expression for computing the 
equivalent variation: 
f 
~ 
EV = t 
f0- f"'l0. t 0 nO. o • I
=: e(p , .... , u(x » e(p , , u(x » = 
t 1, i
e(p0 , nO., u(x » e(p , n1 ,. u(x » + ( It - 1° )= = 
"" 
/ 
/ 
dp(t) ¢ dO(t) 
f [x ]dt + ( Ii - TO) (14)= 
t. dt 'A dt 
It is now important to commen~ on the above expression: 
(io In the first place, the computation of the equivalen-t) 
variation (from (14» is made entirely using 6rdinary (i-.e. 
uncompenBated) demand functions. 
(ii) The con::':iidered measure of welfare change is .3.n (:~xact 
measure (i. e. non-app:roximated). If the knowledge about demand 
functions and mal"ginal benefit functions were only 
approximated, the result would also be only approrimated. 
(iii) The marginal benefit function for the i -th good 
( (<p, If..·) + p) is not, in general, the inverse of the respect.!ve 
I. I. 
demand funGtion. For such a result to be valid, it would be 
necessary to assume a convexity hypothesis on preferences. This 
point is interl.;;sting sirice it shut.-Js the economic rel::=_~v,~nce of 
23 
t 
I 
I 
marginal benefit functions associated wit~ qon-convex preferences. 
Therefore the knowiedge of the 5y~tem of marshallea~ dema~d 
functions for all goods is,_ in gene~al, insufficient to assure the 
computation of variations in money metrics when there are quantity 
constraints. Nevertheless if we assumE;! convex ,pl!eferences this 
possibility is,assured. 
(iv) In order. to compute the e~uivalent variation (from (14» 
it is necessary to know the demand and marginal benefit functions. 
However when the quantity constrained goods correspond to public 
goods or externalities, in general, there is· the well known 
pre"ference revelation problem· (se.e Hui"wicz (1:98"6)). This fact is 
an serious obstacle for the j:mplementation of (14). Note, however 
that the approach remains, in pri~ciple; implementable . 
.\ 
In conclusion we have seen in this / section hoYl to compute 
\ 
welfare change measures when d~mand,and'marginal benefit functions 
are known and conform to the restriction~ of Consumer's Theo.ry. 
If, however J to assure consistency wi t.h Consumer's Theory, 
the e5tim~te~ functions are derived from a postulated functional 
form for the indirect utility function or for t.he expendit,ure 
function, 'the calculation of the welfare change measures becomes 
immediate. 
J 
1 
I 
t 
I 
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4..:.. Mpricatjons 
4.1. E EV as an Aggregate 'Measure of Efficiency and 
Welfare in an Economy with Public Goods: 
," 
This subsection will'~~amirie the prope~ti~s of th~ sum of th~ 
equivalent variations, as an aggegat~ -measure of eff iciency 
welfare in an economy with public goods. 
In particular we will tr~ to establish the relationship 
. ­
between the summation of th~ e~uivalent variation (taking a Pareto 
optimal allocation as the base situation) and Pareto optimaillty. 
The properties of this measure will be discussed in the 
framework of a very economy (fUllowing, in part"
/ 
, , 
, Dierker and Lenninghaus l1986»). 
The economy 'has H consumers who will be identified by the 
superscript h (h e H = {1,2, ... , H}l. 
" 
We can define a partition on the h-consumer' 5 consumption 
bundle: 
where xp is a private goods vector of dimension nt' xQ is a public 
goods vector of dimension n (n +n =n) and 1 is leisure. 
2 1·2 . 
To each consumer corresponds a consumption set which will be 
Xh.denot e d as The consumption set will be identified with 
~nx[0,T]_ The consumer preference preordering can, by assumption,
+ 
be represented by a utility" function, smooth and quasi-concave. 
Labor is the only production factor in this economy. The 
technologically feasible and efficient production plans c0rre~pond 
25 
I to the production possibilities frontier. The 'production • .. possibilities frontier may be. represented by the function: 
1: [Rn --fo [R . 
which associates wi th each ·consumption· ·bundle of private· and1 
p~blic goods, the· quantity 'of the labor endowme"nt which remains 
aVAilable for leisure. The function 1 is assumed to be smooth and 
concave. A resource allocation is possible if it belongs to the 
set'P J of feasible resource .allocations: 
h p = { [ X. h p. J X J P 
/' 
/ 
the set Pis, by.assumption, convex. This'property may be readily
• I 
\ 
.illustrated in which there is only. one consumer and to goods: a 
consump.tion good-and leisure. 
We may now present a simple maximization problem in which the 
. the maximand is, precisely) the sum of the equivalent v.).riations 
(E EV). The problem will be exactly the "first best" problem of 
optimal provision of public goods formulated and solved by 
Samuelson (1954). 
The problem may be formulated as: 
h 0 0 h h 0 0 hO 
max e (D , x . e (p ,E ~p a J u ) - p xQ; u ) 
S.t. 
xQh = xQ 

-
E X h - X P P 
E lh = 1( x p , xu) 
26 
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I 
The coiresponding 1agrarigean function"may be written: 
E h e 0 (pp' 0xQ; h u ) h + E Ah(XQ-XQ~ + ¢(xp 
+ e (1 ( x p ' xQ) - E Ih) 
in which the price of labor (the opportun'ity cost of leisure) is 
ommited in the definition of the' expenditUl'e functio'n since 
leisure is taken as numeraire. 
Rearranging the firs~ order conditions for an interior 
solution we can get the following: 
t 
I 
t 
I 
I 
f jh 
au. 01 
'1iJ x. ox.· 
\.0. \.0. 
L-
\) 
h = (20) I au 01 t 
h(} h fX. ox. 
i•JP JP 
i 
in which the first condition has the form of an interpe':c50nal 
equity condi t . .ion which can be annunciated as assuring that the I 
marginal utili ty of any privaf.e good divided by the marginal 
utility of income is the same for all consumers. 
The second is just Samuelson' s condition for the optimal 
provision of public goods. This condition requires that th.e sum of 
the 
goods) equals the respective marginal rate of transformation. 
• 1 
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1 
There are additional ~ondi tions that rep.roduce the, defini tion 
of feasible allocation. 
Consider now any Pareto optimal resource allocation: 
which will be' taken by hypot~esis to De interior.· 
By a argument simirar to the one used for establishing the 
Second Fundamental Theorem of W~lfare Economics (Nikaido (1968») 
we can show that associated with any Pareto optimal allocation, 
there 
the 
is a price vector 
provision level 
for the private goods that, contingent 
for the public goods, permits 
on 
de~centralization. 
Consider no~ the following problem: 
Emax 
s.t. 
h * 
e (pp " *x .a' u 
h ) h e * (pp' • h*x - u )a' 
I, 
1 
i 
h 
= iXQ XQ 
E X p 
h 
= 'x p I 
h .E 1 .= l( xp7 xQ) 
It is easy to verify that: 
is a solution to the above problem. That is, the maximization of 
-
the E EV leads to the Pareto optimal allocation used as its basis. 
The~e result as h 1· s the
- an important corollary. If {u }"v:=" 
utility vector associated with an allocation which is not Pareto 
I 
",', 
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optimal, then: 
h .. h h *E e (p J U ) - e (p J 
P P 
but t~en (-E EV) can. be used as an index of inefficiency in the 
allocation of resources. 
Note further that this inefficiency index is not, in general, 
null when comparing Pareto optimal .~lloc~tions. If {Uh}hEH is the 
utility vector associated with a ~e50urge allocation which is not 
Pareto optimal then: 
,h. * • h. • h*E e t p p J x ; U h. ) - e (pp' x ; U )::5 0Gt Gt 
/ 
/ IThis result ,shows that E EV is not a' pure ineffici~ncy index . . implying (implicitly) distributional judgements. 
These results are analogous to those derived by Diewert 
I 
( 1985) f or a private goods economy: Diewert ( 1986) proPClsee t.he i t 
use of efficiency measures in th~ tradition of Debreu (1951) for 
, 
an economy with public goods. In the same line, there' are , 
1 
suggestions by Cornes and Sandler (1986). The measure presented in 
this subsection is in the tradition of Hicks (1943) and Boiteaux 
j(1953). 
I . . The E EV fits into the scope of the measures defe:ndcd 
......~ 
"J
"If 
Harberger (1971) for Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
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4.2. The Provision of Pctblic Goods and the Economic 
Theo of Index Numbers. 
'. 
The extension of the economic theory of index numbers to the 
consideration of the provision of public goods was proposed by 
Baye and Black (1986). They. pro.posed a ~imple generalization of 
the Konus Index: 
1. :t 
e(p ,xa'u) 
I(p1. , p 0 , 
. 0 0
e{p ,xQ'u) 
"'" the properties of which will be summarily pr~sented. 
/ 
1.We are going to consider the index / 1(. ) in which u = u. 
Therefore, if the" e,*penditure' level is invariant between thE; base 
and the current period r1 =1o, we can write: 
1.' 0 0 
,....,0. 1) < (0u 2: u .. e(p , u,u -ep, 
1 0 1 0 
+to I (p , p , X , X , u) ~ 1 
Q Q 
this, because I (p :1 J p o , u) ;5; 1 is, in the stated 
conditions, equivalent to EV ~ 0. 
For the more general case in which Ii may be different from 
rO, the result is: 
:1 0 1 ° :t 0 ° :1 
u >- u· 4+ I ( p, P 7 Xu ' x""~ , u ) x (I /1 ) s 1 
ry;e will ShOvi that the .second term is equivalent to EV > 0: 
30 
1 1 O
e(p 1 X' • u) IQ' 
s 10 1 I;1 ie(p0 X ,U)I Q 
I 
f 
e(p1 i Ii,Xa,U) 
~ 
0 o . O
e(p ,Xa,U) r
e(p i. ,X i. - ,U) I9 
r",,_t r 1., 10~ (() given that ~..L ... ' 0 o , 
,~. ..,) Iie(p 
''''''0.'1.4 
t0.0'e(p° 1 , U ) 1° ~ 0 
i 0 o . -0
e(p° , 0.0', u ) e(p , n ;.u(x ») ~ 0 
So we have, finally: 
EV ~ 0 
/ 
/ 
, 
This type o~ r~sult is the basis for the generalization of 
the 'economic theory of index numbers by the inclusion of state 
. provision of public goods. The pro~ision of public goods by the Ii 
~ 
i 
state is modelized here as corresponding, for the consumer, to a t 
quantitative restriction. 
I
t 
i 
I 
i 
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preference pre-ordering 
j
1; 
4.3. Individual Costs of Involuntary Unemployment, 
t 
Given the classical definitio~ of involuntary unemployment by 
Keynes (1936, p.15), we will take it as implying that the consumer I 
f iuds himself f acing quanti~y constraints in the job market, in 
the sense that, given relative pr;ices J he is forced to COfi5urne t 
more leisure· than he would lil-re to. Thus J we may apply the I 
methodology of the first three sections' of the paper to the i 
determination of the individual costs of involuntary unemployment. 
To be specific, we will take the simple case. of a consumer of 
two goods: leisure, 1, and a. composite consumption good, C. ~-le I 
fwill also assume that t~e consumer 

re~resent~d by a utility func£ion srnoot.h., 

.1 
monotone. 
On the production side, we will assume that labor is the only 
produ<Jtion factor and that there' are constant returns to ;3cale. 
Note tha~ these hypotheses are cQnsistent with the existence of a 
linear technology, 
Consider further that, in this economy, the relative price of I 
goods in terms of leisure is one. The c9nsumer has an endowmen~ of j 
i 
time, T and of consumption goods, B. i I 
. The expenditure function for this case is defined as: 
e( . u) = min { C + 1 : u(c, 1) ~ u}Q 
We will take the situation in which the consumer is unemployed 
as the base situation. In such a situation the consumer enjoys hIs 
endowment of time, T, as leisure and consum'es his endowment· of 
consumption goods, $. 
32 
" We can define the indivfdual' cost of'ln:voiuntary unemploymelJt 
I 
as the equivalent variation'· associated .withthe pa'~5age from the 
. . 
base 51tuation to a 5ituation 'in which there ' the quant1ty i 
constraint on the consumption of leisure would not exist. This J, 
5ituation would be characte~i~ed by. a .;onsumption . It of leisure 
and, therefore, of 8 + (T - 11) of.~he consumption good. I 
Thus the individual cost of unemployment can be formally 
,defined as: 
leu = EV = 
e( 1,' T; u(8 + (T - It), l:i» - e( 1, T;.u(8 ,T» (21 ). 
i 
I 
i 
Given that: /
.\ ! 
e( 1, T; u(8 ,T» = e( 1, Ii; u(B + (T _;11) ,11» = ·1f 
= B + T 1 
. (21) can be re-written as: 
lEU - e ( , 1, T; u ( e + (T -11 ) , i't ) ) 
- e( 1,11'; uC8 + (T _11.) ,11 ») 
, ! 
which, denoting 8e/61Q as' -~, we have: I I 
or 
lEU =J' (-(1) dt (22)11. 
This type of. approach" allows us to question the id~a 
. 
suggested in some macroeconomic textbooks that the cost associated 
. , 
wi t,h unel'!1ployment could be measured through the associated losses 
33 
-I 
,
in production. 
For an· interpretation of unemp~oyment as a rationing 
phenomenon, see Ashenfelter (1980) " 
f 
f. 
I 
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